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Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice (“Greenaction”) submits this 
Supplemental Filing No. 4 to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) adding significant new 
facts, not previously known to the NRC or other regulatory agencies, about the nature, extent and 
impact of Tetra Tech’s radiological fraud on the cleanup at Hunters Point Naval Shipyard (“HPNS” 
or “Shipyard”). This Supplement adds to the already significant evidence Greenaction has brought to 
the NRC in its Petition to Revoke Tetra Tech’s Materials License (“Petition”) and supplemental 
filings.1 Taken as a whole, Greenaction has provided more – much more – than sufficient evidence 
for the Petition Review Board (“PRB”) to recommend instituting a proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 
§ 2.206. 
This new and previously unknown evidence reveals that two parcels, Parcel A and Parcel D-
1, both of which the Navy claimed for years were not radiologically impacted, actually are. This 
supplement also demonstrates that the fraud was carried out with the full knowledge and 
participation of Tech EC, Inc.’s (“Tetra Tech”) corporate management. Finally, it summarizes some 
of the regulatory violations committed by Tetra Tech that were not included in the NRC’s woefully 
deficient investigation into the fraud.  
If the PRB refuses to recommend further proceedings when there is such overwhelming 
evidence that Tetra Tech breached its license obligations, on a scale unmatched by any licensee at a 
radiological cleanup site, the NRC will be acting arbitrarily and capriciously, in dereliction of its 
duty to adequately protect the public’s health and safety. 
 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
On October 17, 2018, the PRB hosted a public meeting including Greenaction and Tetra Tech 
to discuss Greenaction’s Petition and its subsequent supplemental filings.  
                                                 
1 Supplements to the Petition include Supplemental Filing No. 1(January 18, 2018), Supplemental 
Filing No. 2 (February 13, 2018), Supplemental Filing No. 3 (July 23, 2018), Greenaction’s Reply to 
Tetra Tech’s Response (October 17, 2018), the Transcript of the October 17, 2018 phone 


































On February 27, 2019, Greenaction’s counsel was informed by NRC Petition Review 
Manager James Smith that the PRB’s preliminary recommendation to the Director of Operations was 
to dismiss the petition because Greenaction had not brought “significant new information” as 
required under NRC guidance.2 
The PRB has offered Greenaction an opportunity to address it by teleconference prior to 
finalizing its recommendation. The teleconference is scheduled for June 25, 2019. 
 
III. SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS 
A. Parcel D-1 Is Radiologically Impacted 
i. Soil from Shaw’s Parcel D-1 Sewer Projects Was Screened by Tetra Tech 
Shaw Environmental and Infrastructure, Inc. (“Shaw”) was a Navy contractor at the Shipyard 
for both chemical and radiological remediation. One of the radiological contracts awarded to Shaw 
involved the removal of the radiologically-impacted sanitary and storm water sewer systems and 
associated soils from Parcel D-1’s Gun Mole Pier.  
On December 10, 2010, Shaw and Tetra Tech entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MOU”) under which all soil from Shaw’s Parcel D-1 sewer projects was transferred from Shaw to 
Tetra Tech’s Radiological Survey Yard No. 2 (“RSY-2”) for radiological screening.3  
All soil transfers were to be memorialized in transfer-of-custody documents.4 After Tetra 
Tech’s scanning of Shaw’s soil at RSY-2, custody of the soil was transferred back to Shaw. Shaw 
then transferred radiologically-impacted soil to a licensed transportation company, Environmental 
Management Services (“EMS”) for disposal at a licensed low-level radioactive waste disposal 
facility. The soil that was not impacted was stored onsite awaiting final results of offsite laboratory 
analysis and approval from the Navy’s Radiological Affairs Support Office (“RASO”) for the soils’ 
                                                 
2 Although the standard is analyzed hereinafter and Greenaction more than meets it, Greenaction 
does not concede that it is appropriate. 
3 See Memorandum of Understanding RE: US NRC License Use at Hunters Point Shipyard, October 
7, 2010 (signed October 10, 2010), attached as Exhibit 1. 
4 See Declaration of Elbert Bowers in Support of Supplemental Filing No. 4, attached as Exhibit 2. 


































final disposition. After RASO approval, the soil that was not impacted was backfilled by Shaw into 
the D-1 trenches from which the soil originated.5 
Because the scanning of Shaw’s soil at RSY-2 was done by Tetra Tech, Shaw did not control 
the quality of the scanning.6 As demonstrated in Greenaction’s Petition, RSY-2 operations were 
managed by an unqualified supervisor who systematically and intentionally directed the fraudulent 
scanning of soil so as to be cleared for free release.7 There is no reason to believe Tetra Tech 
operated RSY-2 any differently for Shaw’s soil than it did for Tetra Tech’s.  
As Bert Bowers’ declaration attests, improper operations at RSY-2 resulted in at least one 
radiologically contaminated object remaining in supposedly “clean” soil after having been scanned at 
RSY-2 by Tetra Tech and transferred back to Shaw for use as fill. Shaw Health Physicist (“HP”) 
Billy Vo told Bowers he was instructing a junior HP on how to use a Ludlum scanning instrument 
when the junior HP’s meter spiked over soil cleared for free release at RSY-2 to be used as backfill at 
D-1. This spike indicated radiation levels so high that the Ludlum instrument was not capable of 
giving an accurate reading. Another device more appropriate for high-level measurement was 
procured to get a more accurate reading. The scanning uncovered a highly radioactive object, a 
radioactive “button,” which was ultimately removed.8 
The discovery of a highly radioactive object in soil that was deemed clean for use as backfill 
indicates improper scanning and remediation of Parcel D-1 soil at RSY-2, just as was done with Tetra 
Tech’s soil. 
Parcel D-1 has not yet been included in the Navy’s re-sampling plan because it is only 
reviewing work done by Tetra Tech. To this date the Navy has not even admitted that Tetra Tech’s 
screening of Shaw’s D-1 soil even occurred. However, as the Navy has known for almost a decade as 
                                                 
5 See Exhibit 3: annotated map of a portion of HPNS depicting the location of RSY-2 and the areas 
Shaw used to store soil after scanning by Tetra Tech and before final clearance from RASO (October 
31, 2011). Piles of soil are clearly visible in the designated areas; See also Declaration of Elbert 
Bowers in Support of Supplemental Filing No. 4, Exhibit 2. 
6 See Declaration of Kevin J. McLaughlin in Support of Supplemental Filing No. 4, attached as 
Exhibit 4.  
7 See Petition at 26. 



































it approved the MOU, work done by Tetra Tech includes scanning at least one other company’s soil: 
Shaw’s. As a result, Shaw’s Parcel D-1 work must be re-sampled too, as this Supplemental presents 
significant new information herein that the Parcel D-1 sewers may be contaminated.  
ii. High Levels of Radioactivity Were Discovered in Parcel D-1 Surface Soil 
The Navy has contended for years that an area of Parcel D-1 bounded by H Street, Hussey 
Street, Mahan Street, and Berth 29, was never radiologically impacted.9 The Navy is wrong. It was 
impacted. 
On April 15, 2010, Radiation Safety Officer Representative (“RSOR”) Bert Bowers was 
summoned to check on reports of something “unusual” at D-1.10 Bowers went there and met Tetra 
Tech Radiation Task Supervisor (“RTS”) Justin Hubbard.11 Bowers was told that an area of high-
level radiological contamination was found while scanning in preparation for taking background 
reference samples. Bowers saw soil in a gallon-sized zip lock plastic bag which he understood was 
taken for laboratory analysis. Bowers took time-stamped photos of the area around where the soil was 
taken.12 He also notified his superior at Tetra Tech, Radiation Safety Officer (“RSO”) Erik 
Abkemeier. Standard operating procedure would have called for notification to RASO. Bowers did 
not hear anything regarding the results of any testing related to this soil sample.  
The witness who found the high radioactivity13 estimated that that the reading he took on the 
2350 Ludlum scanner was 750,000 counts per minute. He says the scanner picked up the radioactivity 
from more than three feet away. This witness also stated that spot was dug out and the contaminated 
soil disposed of in a low-level radioactive waste bin. The witness heard that the lab tests came out 
                                                 
9 See Parcel D-1 Record of Decision, at 19. 
10 See Exhibit 2 - Declaration of Elbert Bowers in Support of Supplemental Filing No. 4.paragraphs 
3, 4 and 5. 
11 Hubbard is one of two Tetra Tech supervisors who pled guilty to fraud-related charges and was 
sentenced to 8 months of incarceration. See Exhibit 3 to Greenaction’s Reply to Tetra Tech’s 
Response (October 17, 2018): Department of Justice Press Release Radiation Control Technician 
Supervisors Sentenced For Falsifying Former HPNS Clean-Up Records (May 3, 2018). See also 
Plea Agreement NO. CR 17-0123 JD, US v. Stephen C. Rolfe; Plea Agreement NO. CR 17-0278 JD, 
US. v. Justin E. Hubbard, attached collectively as Exhibit 5. 
12 See Exhibit 6A-G, pictures of the scene. Building 526 clearly identified as “Bldg 526” above the 
door and spray-painted on the door. The location of the Gun-Mole Pier in the background provides 
additional support for the geographical location.  
13 The witness was not willing to submit this declaration publicly. See Exhibit 7, Declaration of 


































high for radium226, between 28 and 32 millirem per gram (mrem/gr). He also states that he was told 
by Justin Hubbard and subsequently by Tetra Tech’s top onsite manager, Project Manager Bill 
Dougherty and that the Navy would not want to hear about the contamination in D-1 so Tetra Tech 
was not going to tell the Navy. Construction Superintendent Dennis McWade was present when 
Dougherty made this statement.14   
To date, Parcel D-1 has not been identified as impacted. The existence of high-level radiation 
should have resulted in characterization of the whole parcel. It has never been done. Until 
characterization has been completed, a health and safety risk of unknown proportion will exist at D-1. 
The suppression of this contamination provides further evidence contradicting the NRC’s assumption 
that no Tetra Tech managers above Hubbard actively participated in fraud.  
iii. Shaw Used Tetra Tech’s Onsite Laboratory for Soil Sample Testing  
Tetra Tech provided more services to Shaw than just soil scanning. Shaw also used Tetra 
Tech’s onsite laboratory for its analyses. According to a former Shaw senior Radiation Control 
Technician (“RCT”), Kevin McLaughlin, Shaw used Tetra Tech’s onsite lab from June 2010 to 
August 2012.15 The MOU between Shaw and Tetra Tech also explicitly states that Tetra Tech was 
responsible for Shaw’s onsite laboratory needs.16 
Since the Petition demonstrates that lab data were altered by Tetra Tech employees, Shaw’s 
data may be of questionable reliability just as Tetra Tech’s was found to be.   
The Navy has been forced to retest Parcel G after throwing out data from many thousands of 
samples after EPA’s review revealed evidence of “falsification and data manipulation” and other 
reliability problems associated with Tetra Tech’s data.17 The U.S. Attorney‘s allegations in recent 
filings parallel the evidence of fraud at Tetra Tech’s lab, asserting that Tetra Tech committed fraud in 
connection with a contract requiring it to maintain onsite laboratory services to test survey samples 
for radionuclides of concern in support of contractors base-wide.18  
                                                 
14 Exhibit 7, Declaration of Steven Castleman, paragraph 3. 
15 See Exhibit 4, Declaration of Kevin McLaughlin, paragraph 11. 
16 See Exhibit 1 MOU. 
17 See for example EPA Comments on Draft Radiological Data Evaluation Findings Report for 
Parcels B and G Soil (December 27, 2017), Exhibit 2 to Supplemental Filing No. 3, at 4. 



































But for Greenaction uncovering this new and significant information and bringing it to the 
NRC, the fact that D-1 is radiologically impacted would have remained unknown. 
B. Parcel A Is Radiologically Impacted 
i. The Former Sewer Systems Were Impacted But Never Investigated 
Parcel A’s former sewer systems were impacted but never investigated or reported by Tetra 
Tech.19 Samples taken from the sanitary sewer system by Bert Bowers on January 28, 2004 indicated 
elevated radium-227.20 At the time, Tetra Tech was the prime contractor responsible for Parcel A, 
including its subcontractors. Tetra Tech failed to follow up on this survey result. The sewers were 
removed and the surrounding soil that was likely also impacted was pushed into other areas of Parcel 
A. Shortly after the survey revealed radiological contamination the parcel was released and 
ownership transferred by the Navy so construction of homes could begin.  
ii. Evidence of the Impact Tetra Tech’s Fraud Has on Public Trust 
In its October 17, 2018 reply to Tetra Tech’s opposition to the Petition, Greenaction apprised 
the NRC of eyewitness and documentary evidence, including sampling results, indicating that the old 
Parcel A sanitary and storm water sewer systems were radiologically impacted and should have been 
investigated but never was. Greenaction’s information is that the sewers were disposed of at an 
unknown location not located on the Shipyard and that the associated soils were bulldozed down one 
of Parcel A’s hills in order to grade the area for development. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Contract number N62473-07-D-3211, task order 0018. The U.S. Attorney alleges, and therefore has 
information or a good faith belief in particularized and specific acts underlying this document. Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 11 (“By presenting to the court a pleading [such as a complaint] … an attorney … certifies 
that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances … the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation or discovery”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 (“In alleging fraud …, a party must 
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud”). 
19 See Exhibit 2, Declaration of Bert Bowers, paragraph 13. This issue was discussed briefly in 
Greenaction’s Reply to Tetra Tech’s Response to 2.206 Petition (October 17, 2018), at 4. Exhibit 2 
describes the sampling in more detail. 
20 Copies of the sampling documents are attached to the Greenaction’s Reply to Tetra Tech’s 


































Members of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors held a hearing on the matter on May 14, 
2018, and demanded action.21 In response, although subsurface soil samples were called for, the 
Radiological Health Branch (“RHB”) of the California Department of Public Health only conducted a 
partial surface scan of Parcel A, excluding slopes and hillsides, the very areas where the soil may 
have been disposed. The Health Department’s efforts answer none of the questions about possibly 
still-existing subsurface contamination: How extensively contaminated were the sewer lines? How 
impacted was the soil surrounding the sewer lines; Where are the impacted soil and sewers now; And, 
were the impacted soil and sewer lines properly disposed of?  
Despite the inherent limitations of a Parcel A surface scan, the Health Department stumbled 
upon radiological impact there. In September 2018, the Department’s scanners found a highly 
radioactive “deck marker” about ten inches below the ground surface, merely yards from occupied 
residences.22 The Navy has not explained how the deck marker got to Parcel A in the first place; it 
simply asserts, though it has not looked, there are no other deck markers or other similar 
contamination. 
Evidence of radiological impact so near residents is significant and warrants further 
investigation by NRC.  
To the dismay of nearby residents and city politicians, the Navy’s response has been to 
minimize the significance of the finding, rather than acknowledge that other contamination could be 
there. A proper survey of Parcel A, in fact, could lead to further discoveries of radioactive objects and 
contamination. 
C. Tetra Tech’s Management Was Involved in the Fraud 
The NRC’s 2015 investigation concluded, wrongly, that only Justin Hubbard was responsible 
for Tetra Tech’s fraud. The evidence belies NRC’s assertion. 
i. Further Evidence of Specific Corporate Managers’ Involvement 
In his plea agreement, Stephen Rolfe admitted he knew his “conduct would impede the 
                                                 
21 See Press Release from San Francisco Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure 
(February 6, 2018). Attached as Exhibit 12. 
22 See California Department of Public Health HPNS Parcel A Update #8, September 13, 2018 


































proper investigation and administration of the radiological remediation being undertaken by the U.S. 
Navy at HPNS.”23 Rolfe stated that his motivation “came from pressure applied by the Tetra Tech 
supervisors.”24 Thus far the NRC has not acknowledged Rolfe’s admitted guilt and statement about 
pressure from higher management. Rolfe’s admissions contradict the NRC’s past finding that the 
fraud was limited to Hubbard. 
Greenaction has interviewed additional witnesses to Tetra Tech’s fraud who are not willing 
to be publicly identified but would speak to any investigative agency that can maintain their 
confidentiality. They say the top onsite managers, the Project Manager and Construction Manager, 
were involved in the fraud. The witness25 to the discovery of radium contamination at Parcel D-1 
reported to Greenaction that Justin Hubbard explicitly ordered the suppression of the evidence of 
contamination.26 The witness said that when he protested, he was summoned to Tetra Tech’s onsite 
office where he met with Project Manager Bill Dougherty, Construction Manager Dennis McWade, 
and Jeff Brey, Doughety’s assistant. They told him that the Navy would not want to hear of the 
contamination and its discovery would not be reported.  
More recently, numerous corporate managers have been named by the U.S. Attorney’s civil 
False Claims Act cases, as having “initiated and directed” the fraud,27 including Andrew Bolt (then 
Vice President, now President of Tetra Tech), Project Manager Bill Dougherty, Assistant Project 
Manager Rick Weingarz and Construction Manager Dennis McWade.28  
The U.S. Attorney’s complaints echo information submitted to the NRC by Greenaction’s 
Petition; we made copies of Petition and supplements available to the U.S. Attorney. Like the 
Petition, the federal government alleges that the fraud included switching soil samples, falsifying 
building surveys and other reports to the Navy. None of this information was available to the NRC at 
the time it concluded its “investigation” – in 2014. 
                                                 
23 Exhibit 5, Plea Agreement of Stephen Rolfe, at 4.  
24 Exhibit 5, Plea Agreement of Stephen Rolfe, at 4. 
25 The witness was not willing to come forward publically for fear of retribution. See Exhibit 7, 
Declaration of Steven Castleman, paragraph 2. 
26 See Exhibit 7, Declaration of Steven Castleman. 
27 Exhibit 8, United States’ Complaint in Intervention Against Tetra Tech, at 21. 


































ii. New Evidence Demonstrates Tetra Tech’s Anomalous Samples Report Was 
Willfully Inaccurate  
Tetra Tech conducted an internal investigation and reported its findings in the Anomalous 
Samples Report. The report identified a very small number of discrepancies, the same 36 the Navy 
originally questioned but failed to identify who was responsible or where phony samples came 
from.29 Evidence now shows how thoroughly inadequate the NRC’s investigation was. 
Lest there be any doubt that Tetra Tech’s management was involved in the whitewash, the 
Anomalous Samples Report was authored by top safety management: Erik Abkemeier, Tetra Tech’s 
corporate Radiation Safety Officer (“RSO”) and Greg Joyce, the top quality assurance manager.30  
Since its publication, the report has repeatedly been exposed as false not only by 
whistleblowers and at least one of the criminal defendants, but the Navy and EPA as well.  The 
Navy’s own review of Tetra Tech’s data found substantially more evidence of data manipulation by 
Tetra Tech (approximately 40%) than the Anomalous Samples Report. EPA’s review reported 
approximately double the data irregularities, in one Parcel reaching 97%!31  
Tetra Tech “stands by its work,”32 but when challenged at the October 17, 2018, PRB 
conference to publish its defense of its data, it refused.  
Tetra Tech’s self-investigation was fatally flawed because it did not interview any former 
radiation workers like Anthony Smith. It specifically mentions not having interviewed Smith because 
he was no longer onsite, with no mention of any efforts to find him.33 Smith’s information only came 
to light well after the NRC’s investigation - when Greenaction submitted his declaration in support of 
the Petition. That Smith was not interviewed as part of the investigation demonstrates Tetra Tech’s 
self-investigation was wholly incompetent or worse, that Tetra Tech managers willfully 
misrepresented the facts in the Anomalous Samples Report.  
                                                 
29 See Anomalous Samples Report, at 19. Exhibit H to the Petition. 
30 Adam Berry was named by Greenaction declarants Archie Jackson (Exhibit D to the Petition), 
Susan Andrews (Exhibit C to the Petition), and Art Jahr (Exhibit E to the Petition). Rick Weingarz 
was named by the U.S. Attorney (See Exhibit 8, p. 21 of each complaint). Erik Abkemeier was 
named by Greenaction declarant Bert Bowers, Exhibit 2 herein. 
31 See Supplemental Filings No’s 1, 2, and 3. 
32 See Response to DOJ Complaints: Tetra Tech EC Stands by Its Work at Hunters Point Shipyard 
(January 14, 2019), downloaded from Hunterspointfacts.com on June 7, 2019, attached as Exhibit 9. 


































The shortcomings of Tetra Tech’s self-investigation are apparent in comparison to the Navy 
and EPA’s findings when they reviewed Tetra Tech’s data. The Anomalous Samples Report asserts 
that only 36 samples may have been problematic, whereas the EPA found such a high level of 
unreliability that the Navy had to jettison all of Tetra Tech’s data, tens of thousands, if not hundreds 
of thousands of samples. Rather than investigate and report fully and honestly about its deficiencies, 
as NRC expects from its licensees, Tetra Tech wrongly exonerated itself, compounding the fraud by 
covering it up.  
The NRC investigation’s failure to uncover the larger fraud Tetra Tech committed indicates 
it accepted Tetra Tech’s bogus report at face value. This was a grave mistake, fatally tainting its 
investigation. The NRC must correct this failure by instituting the proceedings contemplated by the 
10 C.F.R. § 2.206 process.  
D. More Evidence of Violations Is Readily Available to the NRC 
Counsel for Greenaction have interviewed numerous former Shipyard radiological workers 
who, because they are still working in the field, do not want their identities revealed except to 
government investigators who can guarantee their anonymity during the pendency of any 
investigation. These witnesses have significant knowledge of fraud, but they are understandably 
afraid of the professional and personal repercussions of coming forward publicly.  
Fear of retaliation is real and not uncommon. Multiple witnesses testified that they were 
threatened with firing if they raised objections to the fraud. Some of the whistleblowers were, indeed, 
fired after questioning Tetra Tech’s practices. Susan Andrews’ declaration, for example, details how 
just the threat of risking her stable, long-term job kept her quiet until she left the Shipyard.34  
As stated above, there have been at least two important witnesses who have provided damning 
evidence under the condition that we maintain their anonymity. One has detailed knowledge of a 
wide variety of improper activities. The other has detailed knowledge of the high-level radioactivity 
discovered in surface soil in Parcel D-1.  
                                                 


































Furthermore, although we debriefed the declarants and others multiple times over a period of 
months, there was not enough time to discover all they know. They continue to recall incidents they 
did not previously remember until their memories were jogged by an association they had not made 
before, which is not unusual. In general, they describe Tetra Tech’s culture of poor safety and cutting 
corners..35 But they could give much more evidence of wrongdoing if only they were interviewed by 
an interested, skillful investigator, particularly as part of an NRC’s proceeding.  
 
IV. GREENACTION HAS PROVIDED NEW AND SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION 
WARRANTING THE INITIATION OF AN NRC PROCEEDING 
The PRB should recommend the NRC initiate further proceedings pursuant to Greenaction’s 
Petition because it provides new and significant information warranting further investigation. That 
significance has only been expanded as more and more evidence in the Petition has been 
corroborated.  
A. NRC Guidance Establishes a Low Threshold for Recommending Review 
NRC’s Management Directive 8.11 guidance establishes a low threshold for how much 
evidence in a section 2.206 petition to compel a PRB to recommend further proceedings. A petition 
should be accepted if there is a substantive concern raised and supported by any evidence that the 
NRC has not yet evaluated. A petition need not prove any violations beyond a reasonable doubt or 
even by a preponderance of evidence, but only requires that: 
The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified. The 
petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare assertion. The  
supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry.36  
                                                 
35 See Petition Exhibit E, Declaration of Art Jahr at 4; Petition Exhibit C, Declaration of Susan 
Andrews, at 20; and Petition Exhibit D, Declaration of Archie Jackson, at 4.  
36 Management Directive 8.11, version 2010, at § (c)(1)(ii) p. 11. Note that the 2010 version of 
Management Directive 8.11 was in effect and applies to the Petition and previous supplemental 
filings. The 2019 version of Management Directive 8.11 came into effect in on March 1, 2019 and 
therefore governs the instant Supplemental Filing No. 4. Although some changes were made to the 
form of MD 8.11 in 2019, the changes are not material to this Petition; the threshold for 
accepting/rejecting a 2.206 petition in the 2010 and 2019 versions is similarly not exacting and 


































Where a petition raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff evaluation and review, 
as is the case here, the petition must provide “new” and “significant” information. “Significant” 
means that “the information is sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention and that the 
information is real and not speculative.”37 Greenaction has more than met this low threshold as 
further detailed below. 
 
B. Willful Dishonest Conduct Proved in This Supplemental Is Significant New 
Information Warranting a Proceeding 
Although the section 2.206 process is not itself an enforcement action, the NRC’s 
enforcement guidelines provide instruction on the relative importance of different factors in 
assessing penalties that are useful here. NRC enforcement criteria focus on: whether the violation (a) 
resulted in actual safety or security consequences; (b) had potential safety or security consequences; 
(c) impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function38; or (d) involved 
willingness.39  
The first two criteria involve health and safety. In this case, a new mini-city is intended for 
the Shipyard, housing many thousands of people stretching over many decades. Areas where fraud 
took place cannot be fully known until a competent investigation is concluded, putting construction 
workers and nearby residents at short- and long-term risk of exposure to undiscovered improperly 
remediated soil that will be excavated for building foundations and to install utilities.   
The long-term threat to the public from undiscovered contamination, however, is particularly 
insidious because negative health effects from long term exposure to low-level radiation can take 
decades to manifest and proving causation of particular illness, although anticipated, nevertheless 
remains very difficult.  
                                                 
37 NRC Desktop Guidance for Review of 2.206 Petitions 2018,  at.12, fn 1. The 8.11 Desktop 
Guidance was first published in 2019 (effective March 1, 2019). 
38 NRC Enforcement Policy (May 15, 2018) The Glossary at p. 81 identifies “a situation that 
prevents the NRC from using appropriate regulatory tools to address a noncompliance because the 
Agency is unaware that the noncompliance exists” as an impact that affects the ability of the NRC to 
perform its regulatory oversight function. 


































The NRC’s enforcement guidelines look upon violations which negatively impact the 
integrity and authority of the NRC licensing system and/or violations committed willfully as 
particularly egregious. Notwithstanding an actual or potential safety risk, “noncompliance itself” of 
the magnitude where “adequate protection is no longer provided” can result in the immediate 
suspension of licensed activities.40 Thus, violations that undermine the integrity of the licensing 
system must be considered significant in this proceeding as well. 
Tetra Tech’s fraud and subsequent cover-up are textbook examples of violations that 
undermine the integrity and authority of the NRC’s licensing program. The NRC relies on licensees 
to be truthful and to self-report and correct deficiencies. Tetra Tech did just the opposite. 
Furthermore, willful violations are subject to some of the harshest penalties under the NRC’s 
enforcement guidelines. There can be no doubt that the Tetra Tech fraud was willful. Two of its 
supervisors pled guilty and served time for it. The whistleblowers corroborate the actions described 
by the U.S. Attorney in its sentencing memoranda. 
Because Tetra Tech’s fraud undermines the integrity of the NRC’s licensing system and was 
committed willfully, two factors not known to the NRC until Greenaction’s Petition, Tetra Tech’s 
violations are among those the NRC’s enforcement guidance views most seriously. The PRB should 
not turn a blind eye on such serious violations.  
C. The Evidence Greenaction Has Submitted Is Significant Evidence, Warranting A 
Proceeding 
i. Tetra Tech’s Specific Type of NRC License Is the Starting Point for Analysis 
The type of license and activity under review should be central to the PRB’s analysis. Tetra 
Tech’s has a materials license authorizing the possession and storage of a wide range of 
radionuclides incident to site characterization and decontamination. The license is specific to lower-
level radioactivity impacting a contaminated site. As a result, although safety concerns related to 
Tetra Tech’s activities may be inherently less catastrophic or acute when compared to other 
categories of NRC’s licenses (e.g., nuclear reactor operations with large volumes of highly 
                                                 


































radioactive materials), significant health and safety concerns are inherent to decontamination work. 
The honesty, accountability, and reliability of a material licensee’s data are paramount to the 
NRC’s mission of protecting public health and the environment. Without defensible data, cleanup 
cannot be demonstrated. As the NRC now knows, all Tetra Tech’s data has been thrown out. Data is 
especially important at massive federal sites where remediation is iterative, building on past data sets 
and taking decades. The public health risk of hiding long-term low level radiation onsite will persist 
for hundreds of years. San Francisco plans to build a small city on the site of the Shipyard, housing 
many thousands of residents.  In addition to potential health and safety risks to residents and visitors 
to the future site, leftover contamination poses a danger to future construction workers who will be 
disturbing contaminated soil by excavating, installing utilities, and building foundations. If the PRB 
refuses to recognize the safety concerns with such low-level contamination, it will be as if the NRC 
stopped regulating materials licenses of the sort held by Tetra Tech entirely. As long as these 
materials require licensure, the NRC must take fraud seriously, and must investigate Tetra Tech’s 
fraud at the Shipyard. 
The public relies on the NRC to uphold minimum standards of integrity and reliability. If the 
PRB refuses to recognize how Tetra Tech’s fraud undermined public health and safety, the NRC will 
have failed to fulfil its basic duty to the public.  
Just as critically, the PRB should consider the evidence here “significant” because of the 
potential impact on the public’s trust in the radiological cleanup industry. Refusal to investigate 
would be tantamount to declaring that licensees are allowed to commit fraud with impunity, 
effectively incentivizing cleanup fraud.  
As one industry insider put it, “at this point, the math’s been very simple. The NRC is now in 
the position to inform the industry of the potential consequences…. They’re watching all over the 
country what happens here.”41 
ii. Higher Management Was Involved 
As discussed earlier, the NRC’s past enforcement action found, incorrectly, that there was no 
                                                 


































deliberate misconduct beyond Justin Hubbard, the Tetra Tech supervisor who was issued a Notice of 
Violation.42 To the contrary, the Petition and supplemental filings provide specific and credible 
evidence that there was deliberate misconduct by specific individuals in higher management 
including the top onsite managers, Project Manager Dougherty and Construction Superintendent 
McWade. They directed that corners be cut in meetings, both as described in the Petition and 
buttressed by one of the witnesses who does not wish to be publicly identified and attended a 
meeting where they decided not to tell the Navy about the Parcel D-1 surface contamination.43 
In addition to Hubbard, a second supervisor, Stephen Rolfe, pled guilty to fraud, whose 
motivation to commit fraud “came from pressure applied by the Tetra Tech supervisors.”44   
More recently, the U.S. Attorney has alleged Tetra Tech’s “corporate management,” 
including its current President Andrew Bolt, “initiated and directed” the fraud in its civil Federal 
False Claims Act suit.45  
The NRC must investigate exactly how high up in Tetra Tech the involvement went to 
intelligently evaluate whether the NRC can ever re-establish trust in Tetra Tech, the bedrock of the 
NRC’s relationship with all licensees. 
iii. Volume and Impact of Violations 
New evidence of the sheer volume of violations is staggering, on a scale which bears no 
relation to the findings in previous enforcement action by NRC. New violations implicate different 
regulations, more people, more locations, and a broader time frame. The cost of the fraud as most 
recently estimated by the Navy is up to $300,000,000!46 This proof demonstrates the fraud had a 
much greater impact on the cleanup than was known by the NRC, the Navy and other regulators 
until Greenaction brought its Petition. The scale of the fraud has undermined the public’s trust in 
Tetra Tech, the cleanup, the Navy and the NRC. 
                                                 
42 See Tetra Tech’s Response to the Petition Exhibit 1 (September 19, 2018). 
43 See Exhibit 7, Declaration of Steven Castleman, paragraph 12. 
44 See May 3, 2018 press release, Department of Justice, Exhibit 3 to Greenaction’s Reply to Tetra 
Tech’s Response, October 17, 2018; and Exhibit 5, Plea Agreement of Stephen Rolfe, at 4. 
45 Exhibit 8, United States’ Complaint in Intervention Against Tetra Tech, at 21. 
46 See Navy Victim Impact Statement, Greenaction’s Reply to Tetra Tech Response, Exhibit 4. 


































Previous investigations by NRC were limited geographically to Parcels C and E. However, 
the Petition reveals evidence of fraud in areas beyond those two parcels. Furthermore, this 
Supplement provides evidence of Tetra Tech’s fraud impacting Parcels D-1 and A.  
In addition to the geographic narrowness of the NRC’s prior inquiry, the time period in 
which NRC previously found violations was narrowly limited to 2011 and 2012. In contrast, the 
Petition provides evidence of violations stretching back as far as 2005, 47 while this Supplemental 
provides evidence of deliberate misconduct as recently as 2014 when the Anomalous Samples Report 
was whitewashed was finalized. These violations are clearly outside the scope of previous NRC 
findings. (The United States’ False Claims Act complaints allege the Tetra Tech fraud took place 
between May 2005 and January 2018,48 again corroborating much of the evidence submitted by 
Greenaction. 
The NRC should treat the evidence submitted by Greenaction as the tip of an iceberg of 
fraud. A competent investigation is necessary to characterize its true size, to date still concealed. The 
NRC can take steps to investigate, find additional witnesses and protect them from retaliation, 
something Greenaction cannot do with such limited resources.  
The NRC must look at all the evidence under the umbrella of a single unified investigation, 
rather than piecemeal as it has in the past,49 because the entire body of evidence is much greater than 
the sum of its parts. The evidence adduced by Greenaction in the Petition and since is new and  
 
                                                 
47 Under the plain language of 10 C.F.R. § 30.10, Tetra Tech has a duty to refrain from engaging in 
deliberate misconduct that might have caused any licensee to violate any NRC regulation starting in 
2004 when it first was issued a license, not in 2009 when it was invoked at HPNS. Furthermore, 
anyone with “requisite knowledge who engages in deliberate misconduct as defined by the rule,” – 
knowledge Tetra Tech possessed prior to 2009 – “has the requisite intent to act in a manner that falls 
within the NRC’s area of regulatory concern.” In the Matter of E. Testing & Inspection, Inc., 43 
N.R.C. 211 (May 10, 1996). 
48 Exhibit 8, United States’ Complaint in Intervention Against Tetra Tech, at 5. 
49 Moreover, although the NRC talked to some of them and investigations of retaliation in 2011 and 
2012 revealed discrete safety concerns, the overlap with evidence submitted by Greenaction is 
minimal. Whistleblower interviews by NRC were extremely limited, had a different purpose, covered 
only a small fraction of what whistleblowers knew and were never evaluated for the purpose sought 
by Greenaction’s Petition. In fact, whistleblowers came to Greenaction only after they tried to share 
information with the NRC but were dismissed. See Petition Exhibit A, Declaration of Bert Bowers, at 
40; Petition Exhibit C, Declaration of Susan Andrews, at 19; Petition Exhibit D, Declaration of 
Archie Jackson, at 5. 
significant, and is indicative of a significant body of evidence as yet undiscovered by the NRC and 
2 unavailable to Greenaction. Further investigation is waiTanted. 
3 
4 V. RELIEF REQUESTED 
5 Greenaction respectfully requests the relief the evidence demands. The scope of fraud 
6 described in the declarations on which the Petition relies is sufficient to warrant license revocation. 
7 Tetra Tech has shown itself to be unreliable and untrustworthy, characteristics that preclude NRC 
8 licensure. 
9 However, the NRC has broad powers. If the PRB decides the violations proven herein are not 
10 sufficient to warrant revocation, the PRB should recommend lesser penalties it considers appropriate 
11 to the Director of Operations, including but not limited to license suspension and/or significant fines. 
12 
13 VI. CONCLUSION 
14 This Supplemental 4 provides additional evidence beyond that Greenaction has previously 
15 brought to the NRC. The impact ofthe fraud has been massive. And it has shaken public confidence 
16 in the Navy, the NRC, EPA and other regulators who collectively let the fraud happen right under 
17 their noses. The NRC must initiate a proceeding to investigate Tetra Tech further and ultimately 
18 revoke Tetra Tech' s license or impose a lesser penalty commensurate with the significance ofTetra 
19 Tech's violations. 
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